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Resumo
Due to its complexity, corruption tolerance among public servants has predominantly been investigated through qualitative rather than quantitative research. Accordingly, this article examines tolerance of public corruption through a system dynamics simulation grounded in a linear model that estimates whistleblowing intention. To construct this model, 21 variables related to tolerance of corruption were identified and measured using a Likert-scale instrument. The scores for each variable were used to estimate whistleblowing intention and type (internal or external) among civil servants. As a result, a multiple linear regression model was constructed to identify seven significant variables associated with whistleblowing intention. The most relevant was the rationalization of “strict adherence to procedures,” through which civil servants dilute responsibility and experience dissonance and guilt when they witness an act of corruption.
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