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Abstract
This article proposes some of the principal theoretical and conceptual elements to support animal rights. This right type has found severe restrictions in the current concept of human rights, built from a tradition focused on the modern individual endowed with conscience, language, and judgment to act by morality and law. Being the only creatures that can self-determine and be free, human beings have an intrinsic value and dignity that animals would not have, which makes them deserving of the highest moral status and legal protection. This leads to the problem we seek to tackle: how to overcome the limitations of the concept of human rights that prevent the foundation of the moral status and perhaps fundamental rights of animals. The methodological design of the research consists, on the one hand, of the description of the main theoretical approaches that have been raised from moral and political theory about animal rights and, on the other hand, of some proposals and conceptual distinctions that allow progress in the foundation of animal rights. This analysis shows that there is no symmetry between rights and duties, that dignity can be seen from two perspectives, intrinsic and extrinsic, that there is a distinction between legal persons and rights-holders, and that all these elements allow us to more adequately understand the place that humans and animals occupy in the same ethical and legal community. In conclusion, these distinctions will enable us to formulate fundamental animal rights more clearly and expand the spectrum of rights-holders.
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